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Brentano’s	Evaluative-Attitudinal	Account	of	Will	and	Emotion	Uriah	Kriegel	Forthcoming	in	Revue	Philosophique	(invited	special	issue	on	Brentano)				In	contemporary	analytic	philosophy	of	mind,	Franz	Brentano	is	known	mostly	for	his	thesis	that	intentionality	is	‘the	mark	of	the	mental’	(Chisholm	1957,	Crane	1998).	Among	Brentano	scholars,	there	are	also	lively	debates	on	his	theory	of	consciousness	(Kriegel	2003,	Textor	2006)	and	his	theory	of	judgment	(Chisholm	1976,	Simons	1987).	Brentano’s	theory	of	will	and	emotion	is	less	widely	discussed,	even	within	the	circles	of	Brentano	scholarship.	In	this	paper,	I	want	to	show	that	this	is	a	missed	opportunity,	certainly	for	Brentano	scholars	but	also	for	contemporary	philosophy	of	mind.	Brentano’s	accounts	of	the	will	and	of	emotion	are,	I	will	argue,	both	insightful	and	creative,	on	the	one	hand,	and	strikingly	plausible,	upon	reflection,	on	the	other.			 The	contemporary	literature	on	emotion	is	considerably	larger	and	more	contentious	than	that	on	the	will.	Accordingly,	I	will	start	with	Brentano’s	theory	of	the	will,	and	demonstrate	its	plausibility	against	the	more	peaceful	background	of	current-day	discussions	of	desire	(§1).	Importantly,	however,	Brentano	offers	a	somewhat	unified	account	of	will	and	emotion,	so	I	will	attempt	to	leverage	the	apparent	plausibility	of	his	account	of	will	to	argue	for	a	similar	plausibility	in	his	account	of	emotion	(§2).	This	will	lead	to	the	question	of	how	will	and	emotion	should	be	distinguished	within	the	unified	account	–	something	Brentano	has	very	interesting	things	to	say	about	(§3).		
1. The	Will	
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	In	contemporary	analytic	philosophy	of	mind,	discussion	of	the	will	focuses	on	the	nature	of	desire,	intention,	and	action.	But	the	most	prominent	of	these	notions	is	by	far	desire	(see	under:	‘belief-desire	psychology’).	Accordingly,	I	start	this	section	with	a	presentation	of	leading	accounts	of	desire	in	the	analytic	literature.	Later	I	will	discuss	Brentano’s	account	as	a	particularly	well-developed	version	of	one	of	them.	 A	common	account	of	desire	in	current	philosophy	of	mind	characterizes	it	in	terms	of	functional	role	within	the	overall	economy	of	mind.	More	specifically,	the	idea	is	that	desire	and	belief	are	complementary	states	that	together	causally	explain	the	occurrence	of	observable	behavior.	For	example,	if	Aristide	goes	to	the	kitchen,	open	the	fridge,	and	takes	out	a	beer,	we	can	causally	explain	this	piece	of	behavior	by	citing	(i)	Aristide’s	desire	for	beer	and	(ii)	his	belief	that	by	going	through	these	sequence	of	actions	he	will	obtain	beer	(see	Davidson	1963).	Within	this	picture,	belief	and	desire	are	characterized	in	terms	of	complementary	clusters	of	causal	dispositions.	Robert	Stalnaker	puts	the	picture	crisply:	
Belief	and	desire	…	are	correlative	dispositional	states	of	a	potentially	rational	agent.		To	desire	that	P	is	to	be	disposed	to	act	in	ways	that	would	tend	to	bring	it	about	that	P	in	a	world	in	which	one’s	beliefs,	whatever	they	are,	were	true.		To	believe	that	P	is	to	be	disposed	to	act	in	ways	that	would	tend	to	satisfy	one’s	desires,	whatever	they	are,	in	a	world	in	which	P	(together	with	one’s	other	beliefs)	were	true.	(Stalnaker	1984:	15)	On	this	picture,	desire	is	nothing	but	a	cluster	of	distinctly	motivational	dispositions.			 One	problem	with	this	account	of	desire	is	that	it	is	too	coarse:	many	mental	states	other	than	desire	–	indeed,	mental	states	that	have	nothing	to	do	with	the	will	–	have	a	similarly	motivational	role.	Anger	and	rage	move	us	to	action	all	too	fast	and	all	too	immediately,	but	are	emotional	rather	than	volitional	states.	The	point	is:	it	is	true	that	the	will	is	intimately	connected	to	action,	but	some	emotions	are	as	well.	Stalnaker’s	dispositional	account	really	only	divides	mental	states	into	two	
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groups,	which	we	may	call	‘cognitive’	and	‘conative.’	There	is	still	much	work	left	to	delimit	the	province	of	desire	(and	will)	within	the	conative	domain.		From	Brentano’s	perspective,	there	is	an	even	deeper	problem	with	Stalnaker’s	dispositional	account.	Observe	that	Stalnaker,	in	line	with	the	functionalist	orthodoxy	in	analytic	philosophy	of	mind,	treats	desires	and	beliefs	as	
unobservable	theoretical	entities,	posited	for	the	purpose	of	explaining	observable	action.	For	Brentano,	however,	the	phenomena	of	the	will,	including	desire,	are	not	in	the	first	instance	explanatory	posits,	a	hidden	explanans	of	an	observable	explanandum.	Rather,	they	are	a	type	of	conscious	experience	we	have	first-person	
acquaintance	with.	Furthermore,	what	makes	them	phenomena	of	the	will	is	itself	manifest	to	inner	perception	(Brentano	1874:	II,	83	[235]).1	This	is	not	unreasonable:	even	if	blindfolded,	I	can	know	immediately	and	noninferentially	that	I	desire	to	eat	ice	cream	rather	than	believe	I	eat	ice	cream.	This	at	least	suggests	that	I	can	introspect	(or	rather,	in	Brentano’s	terminology,	inner-perceive)	that	which	makes	my	state	a	desire	rather	than	a	belief.2	Accordingly,	theorizing	about	the	nature	of	desire	should	not	be	driven	in	the	first	place	by	considerations	of	action	explanation.	It	should	first	seek	an	explicit	and	precise	description	of	that	which	inner	perception	presents	in	an	unarticulated	and	‘blurry’	fashion.3		 Another	approach	to	desire	in	contemporary	philosophy	of	mind	construes	it	as	the	paradigmatic	state	with	a	world-to-mind	direction	of	fit:	whereas	belief	is	the	kind	of	state	that	is	supposed	to	fit	the	way	the	world	is,	desire	is	the	kind	of	state	that	the	world	is	supposed	to	fit	(Anscombe	1957,	Searle	1983).	In	believing	that	I	am	eating	chocolate,	I	am	so	to	speak	molding	my	mind	to	fit	the	worldly	fact	that	I	am	eating	chocolate;	in	desiring	to	eat	ice	cream,	I	am	committing	to	molding	the	world	so	it	fits	my	state	of	mind.	The	first	kind	of	state	tries	to	get	the	world	right,	the	second	tries	to	right	the	world	(if	you	will).		From	a	Brentanian	point	of	view,	however,	this	approach	to	desire	faces	a	number	of	problems.	First,	it	is	far	from	clear	what	direction	of	fit	means;	it	is	a	suggestive	metaphor,	but	unpacking	it	literally	has	proven	quite	difficult	(Zangwill	
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1998).	Secondly,	the	most	natural	accounts	of	direction	of	fit	construe	it	as	a	matter	of	functional	role	(Smith	1994),	or	cluster	of	causal	dispositions,	which	would	again	raise	the	above	issues.	Thirdly,	even	if	we	grant	that	belief	is	supposed	to	fit	the	world,	whereas	desire	is	such	that	the	world	is	supposed	to	fit	it,	this	does	not	seem	like	a	brute,	inexplicable	fact.	On	the	contrary,	it	seems	that	something	must	explain	it:	there	must	be	something	about	belief	that	makes	it	supposed	to	fit	the	world,	and	something	about	desire	that	makes	it	such	that	the	world	is	supposed	to	fit	it.			 There	is	also	a	third	approach	to	desire	one	finds	in	modern	philosophy	of	mind,	which	approach	dovetails	much	better	with	Brentano’s	thinking.	This	is	the	notion	that	desire	is	essentially	evaluative:	it	represents	what	it	does	as	good	(in	a	suitably	generic	sense).	When	you	desire	chocolate,	there	is	a	palpable	sense	in	which	your	desire	presents	the	chocolate	as	good.	Thus	while	a	belief	that	p	and	a	desire	that	p	represent	the	same	thing	(have	the	same	content),	the	former	represents	p	sub	specie	boni	whereas	the	latter	represents	p	sub	specie	veri.	Here	is	how	Dennis	Stampe	puts	it	in	his	classic	‘The	Authority	of	Desire’:	
[W]hile	the	belief	and	the	desire	that	p	have	the	same	propositional	content	and	represent	the	same	state	of	affairs,	there	is	a	difference	in	the	way	it	is	represented	in	the	two	states	of	mind.	In	belief	it	is	represented	as	obtaining,	whereas	in	desire,	it	is	represented	as	a	state	of	affairs	the	obtaining	of	which	would	be	good.	This	modal	difference	explains	why	a	desire	that	
p	is	a	reason	to	make	it	true	that	p,	while	the	belief	that	p	is	not.	(Stampe	1987:	355;	italics	original)	We	may	put	the	idea	by	saying	that	desire	is	goodness-committal:	it	commits	to	the	goodness	of	its	intentional	object.	This	is	the	thesis	that	in	the	contemporary	literature	often	goes	by	the	name	‘the	guise	of	the	good.’	Sergio	Tenenbaum	calls	it	the	‘Scholastic	view’	and	formulates	as	follows:	
…	just	as	theoretical	attitudes	such	as	belief	express	what	the	agent	holds	to	be	true	even	when	the	belief	is	false,	the	scholastic	view	claims	that	practical	attitudes,	such	as	intending,	and	acting	itself,	express	what	the	agent	holds	to	be	good.	(Tenenbaum	2009:	96)	In	a	similar	vein,	Graham	Oddie	writes:	‘The	desire	that	P	is	P’s	seeming	good	(or	P’s	being	experienced	as	good)’	(Oddie	2005:	42).	
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	 Interestingly,	the	dispositional	account,	the	direction	of	fit	account,	and	the	evaluative	account	do	not	seem	to	be	in	competition	with	each	other	in	the	relevant	literature.	They	seem	to	be	treated,	rather,	as	different	facets	of	a	single	comprehensive	picture	of	the	nature	of	desire.	Yet	there	is	a	substantive	question	as	to	which	of	these	three	characteristic	features	of	desire	–	its	motivational	role,	its	world-to-mind	direction	of	fit,	and	its	evaluative	character	–	is	more	fundamental	and	explains	the	others.		There	are	certain	advantages	to	taking	the	evaluative	dimension	to	be	fundamental.	First,	nothing	prevents	desire’s	goodness-commitment	from	being	an	occurrent,	inner-perceptible	feature.	This	allows	us	to	do	justice	to	the	fact	that	desire	is	something	we	are	familiar	with	from	our	personal	experience,	not	merely	a	theoretical	posit	that	is	experientially	opaque	to	us.	Secondly,	as	an	occurrent	feature	of	desire,	goodness-commitment	is	well	positioned	to	underlie	and	explain	desire’s	characteristic	dispositional	properties.	And	indeed,	it	is	natural	to	think	that	my	desire	for	chocolate	motivates	me	to	mold	the	world	so	that	I	obtain	chocolate	precisely	because	it	presents	it	as	good	that	I	should	have	chocolate.	This	may	well	capture	the	sense	in	which	the	world	is	‘supposed’	to	fit	the	mind	in	desire.	The	point	is	that	while	goodness-commitment	is	clearly	a	feature	of	desire,	there	are	good	reasons	to	take	it	to	be	the	essential	feature	of	desire,	what	makes	it	a	desire.	Desire’s	characteristic	motivational	role	and	direction	of	fit	flow	from	its	evaluative	nature.		
ge	Brentano	himself	does	not	discuss	the	will	primarily	in	terms	of	desire.	Nonetheless,	I	will	conduct	the	discussion	as	though	he	does,	for	the	sake	of	continuity;	we	will	revisit	the	relationship	between	will	and	desire	with	a	more	critical	mindset	in	§3.		Brentano	clearly	has	an	evaluative	account	of	will/desire:	‘every	[desire]	takes	an	object	to	be	good	or	bad’	(Brentano	1874:	II,	36	[199]).4	However,	there	is	an	important	difference	between	Stampe’s	above	view	and	Brentano’s.	Stampe	maintains	that	desire	is	perception	of	the	good.	Brentano	rejects	this,	for	two	
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reasons.	First	of	all,	he	denies	that	goodness	is	the	kind	of	thing	that	can	be	literally	perceived:	‘There	is	just	no	such	thing	as	a	sensation/perception	(Empfindung)	having	for	an	object	a	quality	called	moral	goodness;	it	is	an	ad	hoc	invention’	(Brentano	1952:	120	[74]).	Secondly,	perception	belongs	with	belief	in	the	category	of	states	that	try	to	get	the	world	right,	not	the	‘conative’	states	to	which	desire	belongs.	To	desire	ice	cream	is	not	to	believe	that	the	ice	cream	is	good.	One	can	believe	that	the	ice	cream	is	good	and	not	feel	like	having	one,	and	one	can	want	one	without	thinking	it	is	good.	The	same	would	apply	to	perception	of	goodness,	if	such	a	thing	existed.	For	Brentano,	a	desire	for	ice	cream	is	a	sui	generis	way	of	positively	evaluating	the	ice	cream,	irreducible	to	perceptual	and	belief-like	ways	of	doing	so:		
I	do	not	believe	that	anyone	will	understand	me	to	mean	that	[desires]	are	cognitive	acts	(Erkenntnisakte)	by	which	the	goodness	or	badness,	value	or	disvalue,	of	certain	objects	are	
perceived	(wahrgenommen);	indeed	I	note	explicitly,	in	order	to	make	such	an	interpretation	completely	impossible,	that	this	would	be	a	complete	misunderstanding	of	my	real	view.	(Brentano	1874:	II,	89	[239])	The	question	is	how	to	characterize	the	sui	generis	way	in	which	desire	presents	goodness.		The	key	to	Brentano’s	answer	is	the	contemporary	distinction	between	content	and	attitude,	which	Brentano	himself	drew	in	terms	of	‘object’	and	‘mode.’	In	saying	that	desire	presents	the	good,	but	in	its	own	sui	generis	way,	Brentano	suggests	that	desire	involves	a	distinctive	attitudinal	property,	which	‘encodes’	desire’s	goodness-commitment.	We	may	put	the	point	as	follows:	my	desire’s	commitment	to	the	goodness	of	chocolate	should	be	understood	not	as	a	matter	of	presenting	chocolate-as-good,	but	of	presenting-as-good	chocolate.	The	goodness	of	the	chocolate	is	not	part	of	what	my	desire	presents,	but	an	aspect	of	how	it	presents.	It	is	not	the	object	of	the	desire,	but	a	dimension	of	the	subject’s	desiring	relation	to	that	object	(in	this	case,	the	chocolate).	As	Brentano	puts	it:	
The	essence	of	will	consists	in	approval	or	disapproval,	hence	in	a	taking-as-good	(ein	
Gutfinden)	or	taking-as-bad	(Schlechtfinden)…	(Brentano	1874:	II,	91	[241])	
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That	is,	the	desire	relates	to	chocolate	through	the	presenting-as-good	relation,	a	distinctive	mode	of	intentionally	relating	to	an	object.	The	attitudinal	approach	recommends	itself	very	strongly	in	the	case	of	desire.	For	clearly,	in	desiring	chocolate	one	does	not	desire	that	chocolate	be	good.	One	simply	desires	the	chocolate.	The	goodness	is	thus	not	part	of	what	is	being	desired,	it	is	not	part	of	the	content	of	the	desire.	And	yet	the	desire	commits	to	the	chocolate’s	goodness.	It	must	therefore	be	that	goodness	shows	up	as	an	aspect	of	the	desire’s	attitude,	of	how	the	desire	presents	what	it	does,	rather	than	of	what	the	desire	presents.	We	might	say	that	the	desire	casts	chocolate	in	a	positive	light	rather	than	cast	light	on	positive	chocolate.		This	is	just	the	idea	that	the	desire	does	not	present	chocolate-as-good	but	presents-as-good	chocolate.	The	goodness	is	a	modification	of	how	the	desire	does	the	presenting.	Accordingly,	to	desire	x	is	to	adopt	an	attitude	that	somehow	favors	
x,	is	pro	x.	In	this	respect,	the	modern	notion	of	‘pro	attitude’	is	very	apt	here:	for	Brentano,	desires,	indeed	interest	states	more	generally,	do	not	just	happen	to	be	pro	attitudes	–	it	is	their	essential	characteristic.5	We	can	appreciate	the	point	by	contrasting	a	desire	for	chocolate	with	a	belief	in	or	perception	of	chocolate’s	goodness.	In	the	latter,	goodness	appears	precisely	as	part	of	the	state’s	content;	in	the	former,	it	is	merely	attitudinal.	Compare	the	intentional	structure	of	the	following	four	putative	states:	Belief	that	chocolate	is	good	::		 present-as-true	<chocolate	is	good>	Perception	of	chocolate’s	goodness	::		present-as-existent	<chocolate’s	goodness>	Desire	for	chocolate	::		 present-as-good	<chocolate>	The	element	of	goodness	shows	up	in	the	content	of	the	evaluative	belief-that	and	perception	(if	such	there	be).	Only	in	desire	does	it	show	up	in	the	attitude.	It	is	in	this	sense	that	desire	involves	essentially	a	sui	generis	mode	of	presenting	the	intentional	object,	one	irreducible	to	the	mode	characteristic	of	belief	and	perception.	
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	 This	is	something	that	modern	proponents	of	the	evaluative	account	of	desire	seem	to	have	missed.	In	the	above	quotation,	Stampe	refers	to	the	evaluative	dimension	of	desire	as	‘modal’	–	presumably	in	the	sense	of	being	attitudinal.	Nonetheless,	he	struggles	with	the	difference	between	desire	and	evaluative	belief,	worrying	that	in	these	two	cases	‘one	and	the	same	state	of	affairs	is	represented	“in	the	same	way,”	that	is,	as	having	the	same	property’	(Stampe	1987:	356).	And	that	leads	him	to	suggest	that	desire,	unlike	evaluative	belief,	is	direct	perception	of	value.	But	Stampe’s	supposed	problem	rests	on	a	mistake.	As	we	have	just	seen,	desire	and	evaluative	belief	do	not	present	their	object	in	the	same	way	(in	the	relevant	sense):	only	the	former	presents-as-good	its	object.	For	that	matter,	they	do	not	even	present	the	same	object:	the	belief	presents	chocolate’s	being	good,	the	desire	just	chocolate.	
ge	Brentano’s	account	of	desire	can	be	captured	in	the	following	pair	of	theses:	EVALUATIVE-D	::	Any	desire	D	for	an	object	O	essentially	commits	to	the	goodness	of	O.		ATTITUDINAL-D	::	A	desire	D’s	commitment	to	the	goodness	of	an	object	O	is	an	attitudinal	property	of	D.	Note	that	EVALUATIVE-D	is	an	essentiality	claim,	not	just	a	universal	or	even	modal	one.	It	implies	that	all	desires	are	necessarily	goodness-committal,	but	that	can	be	accepted	by	functional-role	accounts	of	desire	as	well.	Where	it	goes	beyond	the	functional-role	accounts	is	in	claiming	that	it	is	of	the	essence	of	desire	to	commit	to	its	object’s	goodness.	At	the	same	time,	EVALUATIVE-D	is	compatible	with	accounts	of	desire	that	build	the	evaluation	into	its	content.	A	belief	in	the	goodness	of	world	peace	is	also	goodness-committal,	but	through	its	content.	This	is	what	is	ruled	out	by	ATTITUDINAL-D.	The	upshot	is	an	account	of	desire	that	construes	desire	as	essentially	goodness-committal	in	virtue	an	attitudinal	feature;	call	this	the	
evaluative-attitudinal	account.	
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	 What	is	Brentano’s	argument	for	the	evaluative-attitudinal	account?	The	answer,	I	am	afraid,	is	that	he	has	no	direct	argument.	He	dedicates	§3	of	Chap.	8	of	Book	II	of	Psychology	from	an	Empirical	Standpoint	to	defending	the	view,	but	the	defense	simply	appeals	to	authority:	Lotze,	Kant,	Mendelssohn,	Aristotle,	and	Aquinas	all	shared	the	view,	we	are	told,	so	the	view	‘can	be	regarded	as	generally	accepted	(anerkannt)’	(Brentano	1874:	II,	90	[241]).	One	gets	the	impression,	however,	that	for	Brentano,	central	to	the	view’s	attraction	is	the	way	it	fits	into	an	elegant	bigger	picture.	In	particular,	the	symmetry	between	an	account	of	desire	in	terms	of	presenting-as-good	with	an	account	of	belief	in	terms	of	presenting-as-true	indirectly	recommends	both.	He	certainly	celebrates	the	parallelism:	
If	something	can	become	the	content	of	a	judgment	in	that	it	can	be	accepted	as	true	or	rejected	as	false,	it	can	also	become	the	object	of	a	[desire]	in	that	it	can	be	agreeable	(genehm)	(in	the	broadest	sense	of	the	word)	as	something	good,	or	disagreeable	(ungenehm)	as	something	bad.	(Brentano	1874:	239	[II,	88-9])	Such	‘top-down’	dialectical	pressures	rarely	play	a	role	in	analytic	philosophy	of	mind,	but	are	highly	operative	in	Brentano’s	thinking.		 Our	discussion	has	raised,	however,	certain	independent	considerations	in	support	of	Brentano’s	account.	These	considerations	can	be	divided	into	those	that	motivate	the	evaluative	approach	in	general	and	those	that	support	the	attitudinal	version	of	the	approach.	What	motivates	the	evaluative	approach	in	general	is	the	way	it	avoids	the	problems	attending	rival	approaches,	in	particular	the	functional-role	and	direction-of-fit	approaches.	And	what	motivates	the	attitudinal	approach	to	desiderative	evaluation	is	the	simple	observation	that	in	desiring	chocolate	one	is	not	desiring	that	chocolate	be	good,	but	only	desires	the	chocolate.	Given	that	the	desire	nonetheless	commits	to	the	chocolate’s	goodness,	the	only	way	to	accommodate	this	simple	observation	is	to	build	desire’s	goodness-commitment	into	its	distinctive	attitude.		It	might	be	objected	that	desire	cannot	be	essentially	goodness-committal,	since	we	routinely	desire	what	we	know	full	well	to	be	bad	(see	Velleman	1992).	
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One	may	want	the	boss	to	be	embarrassed,	even	though	one	takes	such	embarrassment	to	be	bad	prudentially,	morally,	and	otherwise.	In	response,	however,	I	would	claim	that	such	cases	involve	conflicting	evaluations.	The	desire	still	presents-as-good	boss-embarrassment,	but	is	accompanied	by	an	evaluative	
belief	whose	content	is	that	it	would	be	bad	if	the	boss	were	embarrassed.	That	is,	the	belief	presents-as-true	that	boss-embarrassment	is	bad.	This	is	perfectly	compatible,	in	a	psychological	sense,	with	the	occurrence	of	a	state	that	presents-as-good	boss-embarrassment	–	as	compatible	with	seeing	(or	seeming	to	see)	the	spoon	bent	in	the	water	while	believing	that	the	spoon	is	not	bent.			
2. Emotion	
	The	philosophy-of-mind	literature	on	emotion	is	much	larger	than	that	on	desire.	But	here	too,	a	stubborn	strand	casts	emotional	states	as	essentially	evaluative.	Indeed,	the	evaluative	approach	to	emotion	has	gained	considerable	traction	toward	the	end	of	the	twentieth	century.	Consider	this	assessment:	
Most	recent	accounts	of	the	structure	of	emotion,	despite	their	differences,	agree	that	emotions	(somehow)	present	the	world	to	us	as	having	certain	value-laden	features.	Following	their	lead,	we	will	say	that	emotions	involve	evaluative	presentations.	(D’Arms	and	Jacobson	2000:	66)	Admiring	Shakespeare,	liking	Messi,	respecting	one’s	colleague,	and	loving	one’s	child	are	all	emotional	states	that	evaluate	their	objects	positively;	resenting	the	boss,	disliking	Donald	Trump,	feeling	indignant	over	the	burkini	ban,	and	being	angry	at	oneself	for	forgetting	one’s	passport	evaluate	their	objects	negatively.	The	claim	of	the	evaluative	account	is	that	emotions	involve	such	evaluations	universally,	necessarily,	and	indeed	essentially.			 Brentano	appears	to	adopt	such	an	evaluative	account	of	emotion.	We	can	see	this	from	the	fact	that	he	considers	‘emotion’	one	appropriate	name	for	the	
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category	of	mental	phenomena	he	contrasts	with	judgments,	and	for	which	he	offers	the	evaluative	account.	In	one	place	he	writes:	
A	single	appropriate	expression	is	lacking	most	of	all	for	the	third	fundamental	class	[of	mental	states],	whose	phenomena	we	designated	as	emotions	(Gemüthsbewegungen),	as	phenomena	of	interest,	or	as	phenomena	of	love…	Just	as	every	judgment	takes	an	object	as	true	or	false,	so	in	an	analogous	way	every	phenomenon	belonging	to	this	third	class	takes	an	object	as	good	or	bad.	(Brentano	1874:	II,	35-6	[199])	It	would	seem,	then,	that	Brentano	does	not	offer	–	at	least	not	in	the	Psychology	–	two	different	accounts,	one	for	desire	and	for	emotion.	Rather,	he	offers	a	single	account	that	is	supposed	to	apply	to	a	category	of	mental	phenomena	that	covers	emotions	and	desires	alike.	To	that	extent,	the	kind	of	evaluative	account	we	have	encountered	in	§1	is	supposed	to	be	equally	an	account	of	emotion	–	one	that	anticipates,	then,	the	more	recent	evaluative	theories	of	emotion.		These	recent	evaluative	accounts	typically	come	in	two	varieties.	One	casts	emotions	as	evaluative	judgments	(Solomon	1976):	to	admire	Shakespeare	is	to	judge	him	admirable,	where	admirability	is	a	species	of	goodness	(being	admirable	is	a	way	of	being	good,	in	a	suitably	generic	sense	of	that	term).	The	other	casts	emotions	as	evaluative	perceptions	(de	Sousa	1987):	to	dislike	Donald	Trump	is	to	perceive	him	as	dislikable,	where	dislikability	is	a	species	of	badness	(a	way	of	being	bad).	As	we	have	seen,	however,	Brentano	does	not	take	mental	states	belonging	to	the	relevant	category	to	be	evaluative	judgments	or	perceptions,	but	to	constitute	a	sui	generis	category	characterized	by	a	distinctive	intentional	mode.	For	him,	then,	the	evaluative	dimension	of	emotion	cannot	consist	in	emotion	presenting	normative	entities.	Rather,	it	must	be	a	matter	of	emotions	normatively	presenting	regular,	nonnormative	entities.	As	he	puts	it:		
…	the	expressions	which	we	use	here	[to	designate	the	evaluative	character	of	emotion]	do	not	mean	that,	in	the	phenomena	of	this	class,	goodness	is	ascribed	to	something	which	is	agreeable	as	good,	and	badness	is	ascribed	to	something	which	is	disagreeable	as	bad;	rather,	they	too	denote	a	particular	way	in	which	mental	activity	refers	to	a	content.	(Brentano	1874:	II,	90	[240])	
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My	admiration	of	Shakespeare	does	not	present	Shakespeare	as	good	so	much	as	presents-as-good	Shakespeare.	My	resentment	does	not	present	the	boss	as	bad,	but	presents-as-bad	the	boss.			 Accordingly,	we	may	formulate	Brentano’s	account	of	emotion	on	the	pattern	of	his	account	of	desire.	One	initial	difference,	though,	is	that	while	desire	always	presents-as-good,	emotions	divide	into	those	that	present-as-good	and	those	that	present-as-bad.	A	desire	for	chocolate	presents-as-good	chocolate,	but	it	would	be	a	mistake	to	think	that	a	desire	for	avoiding	vodka	presents-as-bad	vodka;	rather,	it	presents-as-good	vodka-avoidance.	We	can	see	this	from	the	fact	that	avoidance	shows	up	in	the	content	of	the	desire.	That	is	what	the	desire	just	mentioned	is	a	desire	for:	the	avoidance	of	vodka.	It	is	an	open	question	whether	there	are	states	of	the	will	other	than	desire	that	essentially	present-as-bad.	If	aversion	is	a	state	of	the	will,	it	would	be	a	case	in	point:	aversion	of	vodka	certainly	presents-as-bad	vodka.	In	any	case,	emotions	clearly	divide	into	positive	and	negative:	some	cast	their	objects	in	a	positive	light	(joy,	love,	admiration),	others	in	a	negative	light	(fear,	frustration,	personal	dislike	or	antipathy).		A	formulation	of	Brentano’s	account	of	emotion	paralleling	his	account	of	the	will	would	therefore	look	like	this:	EVALUATIVE-E	::	Any	positive	(negative)	emotion	E	about	an	object	O	essentially	commits	to	the	goodness	(badness)	of	O.		ATTITUDINAL-E	::	An	emotion	E’s	commitment	to	the	goodness	(badness)	of	an	object	O	is	an	attitudinal	property	of	E.	We	may	call	this	the	evaluative-attitudinal	account	of	emotion.	Although	evaluative	approaches	to	emotion	are	common	in	contemporary	analytic	philosophy	of	mind,	their	evaluative	version	is	less	so	(though	see	Denonne	and	Teroni	2012	Chap.7).		If	one	does	adopt	an	evaluative-attitudinal	account	of	emotion,	but	also	an	evaluative-attitudinal	account	of	will,	then	one	faces	the	obvious	question	of	what	(if	anything)	distinguishes	will	and	emotion	–	a	question	we	turn	to	in	§3.		
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	 The	main	motivation	for	the	attitudinal	twist	on	the	evaluative	theory	of	emotion	is,	again,	that	the	value	is	not	part	of	what	is	presented	in	emotion,	what	is	emoted	about.	When	you	admire	Shakespeare,	it	is	just	Shakespeare	that	you	admire.	It	is	not	Shakespeare’s	admirability	that	you	admire,	and	more	generally	not	his	goodness	that	you	emote	about.	Perhaps	you	admire	Shakespeare	in	virtue	of	his	(relevant	type	of)	goodness.	That	would	mean	that	Shakespeare’s	goodness	is	the	
cause	or	reason	of	your	admiration.	All	the	same,	Shakespeare’s	goodness	is	not	the	
object	of	your	admiration.	The	object	of	your	admiration	is	just	Shakespeare.	Accordingly,	any	evaluation	of	Shakespeare	involved	in	admiring	him	cannot	come	from	the	content	of	the	admiration.	It	must	be	built	into	the	admiring	attitude.	To	admire	Shakespeare	is	thus	not	to	be	in	a	mental	state	that	presents	Shakespeare-as-admirable,	but	to	be	in	one	that	presents-as-admirable	Shakespeare.	The	property	of	presenting-as-admirable	is	an	attitudinal	property.	It	is	related	to	the	property	of	presenting-as-good	as	species	to	genus:	presenting-as-admirable	is	eo	
ipso	presenting-as-good	in	the	same	sense	being	a	cat	is	eo	ipso	being	a	mammal.	Just	as	admirability	itself	is	a	species	of	goodness,	presenting-as-admirable	is	a	species	of	presenting-as-good.		 The	same	applies	to	negative	emotions.	When	one	is	afraid	of	a	dog,	one	experiences	the	dog	as	dangerous.	But	one’s	fear	is	not	a	fear	that	the	dog	be	
dangerous.	No,	it	is	simply	a	fear	of	the	dog.	The	element	of	danger	must	therefore	be	attitudinal:	one’s	fear	presents-as-dangerous	the	dog.	And	presenting-as-dangerous	is	a	species	of	presenting-as-bad.			 This	is	important,	because	most	arguments	against	evaluative	accounts	of	emotion	target	the	claim	that	values	are	presented	by	emotions	(see,	e.g.,	Dokic	and	Lemaire	2013).	But	Brentano’s	evaluative	account	does	not	claim	that	values	are	presented	by	emotions,	so	it	is	not	vulnerable	to	arguments	of	this	sort.	Opponents	of	evaluative	theories	must	therefore	proffer	some	new	argument	against	the	attitudinal	version	of	the	evaluative	account.		
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3. Distinguishing	Will	and	Emotion	
	Having	defended	an	evaluative-attitudinal	account	both	of	will	and	of	emotion,	Brentano	faces	the	problem	of	how	to	distinguish	the	two.	Since	they	have	the	same	underlying	nature,	he	takes	them	to	belong	to	a	single	‘fundamental’	category	(Grundklasse).	It	remains	that	there	seems	to	be	some	real	difference	between	emotion	and	volition,	and	this	difference	needs	accounting	for.			 As	one	might	expect,	one	difference	Brentano	points	out	concerns	a	link	to	action:	
Every	willing	(Wollen)	has	to	do	with	an	action	(Tun)	we	believe	to	lie	within	our	power,	with	a	good	which	is	expected	to	result	from	the	willing	itself.	(1874:	II,	103	[249])	Since	all	interest	states	present-as-good	their	object,	they	involve	a	belief	that	it	would	be	good	if	their	object	existed.	Sometimes,	however,	the	subject	believes	not	just	that	it	would	be	good	if	the	relevant	object	existed,	but	also	that	this	would	be	a	good	brought	about	by	herself;	when	this	is	the	case,	the	interest	state	in	question	is	a	will	state	(see	also	Brentano	1952:	219	[137]).	The	idea	might	be,	then,	that	emotional	and	volitional	states	differ	in	that	the	latter	involve	a	belief	the	former	do	not.			 I	suspect,	however,	that	for	Brentano	this	belief-based	difference	is	only	a	symptom	of	a	deeper,	more	essential	difference.	For	note	that	this	difference	between	volitional	and	emotional	states	is	a	cognitive	difference,	whereas	volitional	and	emotional	states	are	noncognitive.	If	volitional	states	were	composite	states	with	a	cognitive	component,	this	cognitive	component	could	certainly	be	part	of	their	deep	nature.	But	Brentano	seems	to	think	that	no	interest	states	have	a	cognitive	component	essentially.	At	most	they	involve	cognitive	accompaniments.	Assuming,	then,	that	the	belief	that	a	good	will	result	from	our	own	activity	is	merely	an	accompaniment	of	volitional	states,	it	would	follow	that	distinguishing	volitional	from	emotional	states	in	terms	of	this	accompaniment	would	be	a	purely	
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extrinsic	distinction.	Yet	surely	there	is	an	intrinsic	difference	between	the	two	–	a	difference	grounded	in	their	own	nature	rather	than	in	their	accompaniments.			 In	a	1907	piece	titled	‘Of	Loving	and	Hating,’	Brentano	seems	to	suggest	the	following	way	of	distinguishing	will	and	emotion:	
There	are	things	which	are	discordant/incompatible	(unverträglich)	with	others,	as	when	for	example	it	is	impossible	for	the	selfsame	physical	thing	(Körper)	to	be	at	once	round	and	square,	at	rest	and	in	motion,	liquid	and	solid,	red	and	blue.	Whoever	wants	or	wishes	(will	
oder	wünscht)	that	an	object	be	one	of	these	things	cannot	at	the	same	time	reasonably	(vernünftiger	Weise)	want	or	wish	that	it	be	one	of	the	others.	But	he	can	at	the	same	time	
enjoy/be	pleased	(ein	Gefallen	finden)	with	it	being	round	and	with	it	being	square	etc.	(Brentano	1907:	156	[150];	my	italics)	In	his	lecture	notes	for	his	Vienna	practical	philosophy	course,	which	he	wrote	originally	in	1876	and	refined	and	added	to	until	1894,	he	writes:	
I	can	love	[i.e.,	have	a	positive	emotion	toward]	things	that	are	incompatible	(unvereinbar)	with	one	another,	for	example	doing	sums	and	writing.	The	one	[positive	emotion]	does	not	preclude/rule	out	(schließt	aus)	the	other.	In	contrast,	in	any	particular	case	I	can	decide	on/make	up	my	mind	in	favor	of	(mich	entscheiden)	one	of	the	two.	These	decisional	acts	(Entscheidungakte)	are	not	compatible	with	one	another.	(Brentano	1952:	218-9	[137])	It	is	in	these	passages,	I	contend,	that	we	get	a	glimpse	into	Brentano’s	ultimate	account	of	the	will/emotion	distinction.	Here	is	how	I	understand	the	account.	Imagine	you	are	finishing	a	hefty	restaurant	meal	and	have	to	choose	among	the	dessert	options.	The	chocolate	cake	does	not	appeal	to	you,	but	either	the	banana	split	or	the	crème	brûlée	would	be	very	nice.	You	feel	like	having	the	banana	split,	but	you	also	feel	like	having	the	crème	brûlée.	Each	feeling	presents-as-good	its	respective	object.	Having	both	the	banana	split	and	the	crème	brûlée	would	be	too	much,	however,	and	anyway	you	cannot	afford	it;	so	you	have	to	choose.	This	is	where	the	will	comes	in.	Conflicting	emotional	states,	such	as	of	the	feeling-like-ϕ-ing	kind,	can	rationally	coexist.	But	a	decision	or	intention	to	ϕ	cannot	rationally	coexist	with	an	incompatible	decision	or	intention.	The	general	idea,	then,	is	that	emotional	states	differ	from	volitional	in	that	conflicting	emotional	states	can	
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rationally	coexist	whereas	conflicting	volitional	states	cannot.	The	principled	distinction	may	therefore	be	represented	as	follows:	DISTINCTION1	::	For	any	interest	attitude	A,	A	is	an	emotional	attitude	iff	there	is	a	pair	of	objects	x	and	y,	such	that	(i)	x	and	y	cannot	coexist	and	(ii)	it	is	possible	to	rationally	bear	A	both	to	x	and	to	y;	A	is	a	volitional	attitude	iff	there	is	no	such	pair.	Some	clarifications.	First,	as	far	as	DISTINCTION1	goes,	‘intentional	object’	covers	everything	that	can	be	desired	or	emoted	about,	not	only	concrete	particulars;	thus	actions,	events,	and	states	of	affairs	are	all	potential	intentional	objects.	(At	the	same	time,	for	Brentano	himself	only	concrete	particulars	will	be	the	objects	of	our	intentional	states,	just	as	they	exhaust	the	objects	of	judgment.)	Secondly,	incompatibility	is	interpreted	here	as	incompossibility,	but	in	truth	a	subtler	story	is	probably	called	for,	where	relations	of	probabilifcation	and	improbabilifcation	play	a	role.6	Thirdly,	note	that	our	distinction	is	between	will	and	positive	emotion;	
negative	emotion	is	distinguished	from	desire	more	straightforwardly	in	terms	of	the	content	of	preference:	a	negative	emotion	toward	x	implies	a	preference	for	x’s	nonexistence	over	its	existence.	In	fact,	fourthly,	our	distinction	is	between	will	and	
mere	positive	emotion.	Obviously,	a	person	may	both	desire	and	have	positive	emotion	about	x	(e.g.,	both	intend	to,	and	be	happy	about,	giving	to	charity).	Fifthly,	a	person	may	prefer	x	over	y	without	preferring	x’s	existence	over	its	nonexistence	–	namely,	in	‘lesser	evil’	cases.		
ge	One	disadvantage	of	DISTINCTION1	is	that	it	does	not	make	explicit	the	Brentanian	emphasis	on	drawing	the	will/emotion	distinction	in	attitudinal	terms.	Relatedly,	it	does	not	seem	to	cite	an	intrinsic	difference	between	emotional	and	volitional	states.		Perhaps,	however,	there	is	a	way	to	build	the	distinction	pointed	out	in	DISTINCTION1	into	specific	attitudes	intrinsic	to	emotional	and	volitional	states.	In	contemporary	moral	philosophy,	there	is	a	familiar	distinction	between	prima	facie	
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and	all-things-considered	normativity.	Against	certain	critics	of	deontological	theories,	W.D.	Ross	(1930)	argued	that	we	do	have	a	duty	not	to	harm	others,	for	example,	but	it	is	a	prima	facie	rather	than	all-things-considered	duty.	Thus,	if	harming	a	terrorist	might	save	a	thousand	innocent	civilians,	the	prima	facie	duty	not	to	harm	others	may	not	proscribe	harming	the	terrorist.	In	that	scenario,	harming	the	terrorist	might	be	prima	facie	wrong	but	ultima	facie	(all-things-considered)	right.	Conversely,	helping	an	old	lady	cross	the	street	is	prima	facie	good,	but	if	it	slows	traffic	to	the	point	that	an	ambulance	arrives	to	hospital	too	late	to	save	someone,	then	it	is	ultima	facie	bad.	Now,	to	say	that	helping	the	old	lady	cross	the	street	is	prima	facie	good	seems	to	mean	this:	in	abstraction	from	all	other	considerations,	the	existence	of	such	help	is	better	than	–	preferable	over	–	the	nonexistence	of	such	help.	And	to	say	that	it	is	ultima	facie	bad	is	to	say	this:	once	we	take	into	account	all	other	relevant	considerations,	there	is	some	scenario	in	which	the	old	lady	is	not	helped	that	is	better	than	–	preferable	over	–	the	scenario	in	which	she	is	helped.		This	distinction	between	prima	facie	and	ultima	facie	goodness	may	be	used	to	formulate	succinctly	Brentano’s	distinction	between	will	and	emotion	in	attitudinal	terms.	The	idea	is	that	positive	emotions	cast	their	objects	in	a	prima-
facie-positive	light,	since	for	something	to	be	prima	facie	good	just	is	for	it	to	be	such	that	its	existence	is	preferable	over	its	nonexistence.	So	in	preferring	white	wine	over	no	wine,	my	happiness	about	white	wine	frames	it	as	a	prima	facie	good.	In	contrast,	acts	of	the	will	cast	their	objects	in	an	all-things-considered-positive	light,	since	for	something	to	be	ultima	facie	good	just	is	for	it	to	be	preferable	over	all	alternatives.	So	in	preferring	red	wine	over	any	other	drink,	my	intention	to	have	red	wine	frames	it	as	an	all-things-considered,	ultima	facie	good.	The	point	is	this:	just	as	generic	goodness	comes	in	two	varieties,	prima	facie	and	ultima	facie,	the	generic	attitudinal	property	of	presenting-as-good	comes	in	two	varieties:	presenting-as-goodPF	(for	‘prima	facie	good’)	and	presenting-as-goodUF	(for	‘ultima	facie	good’).	All	positive	interest	states	generically	present-as-good	their	intentional	objects,	but	some	specifically	present-as-goodPF	their	objects	while	others	present-
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as-goodUF	theirs.	The	former	are	positive	emotions,	the	latter	states	of	the	will.	That	is:	 DISTINCTION2	::	For	any	interest	attitude	A	toward	object	x,	A	is	an	emotional	state	iff	A	presents-as-goodPF	x	(or	presents-as-badPF	x);	A	is	a	volitional	state	iff	A	presents-as-goodUF	x.	To	present-as-goodPF	x	is	to	frame	x	as	superior	to	its	absence;	to	present-as-goodUF	is	to	frame	x	as	superior	to	all	relevant	alternatives.	Note	that	an	outcome	can	be	goodUF	without	being	goodPF,	namely	in	lesser	evil	cases.	(It	is	only	having	considered	all	things	that	Roosevelt	came	to	see	entering	WWII	as	a	good	thing	to	do;	nothing	about	joining	a	war	in	which	upwards	300,000	American	soldiers	died	strikes	one	prima	facie	as	good.)	It	is	for	this	reason	that	among	will	states	we	find	the	state	of	being	willing	to	do	something.	Being	willing	to	do	something	involves	having	a	will	state	despite	lacking	a	positive	emotion,	as	when	I	find	no	pleasure	in	chairing	the	next	session,	but	am	willing	to	do	so	because	someone	has	to.		
ge	There	is	an	immediate	objection	to	this	account	of	the	distinction.	In	addition	to	cases	of	conflicting	emotions,	we	are	all	familiar	with	cases	of	conflicting	desires.	Indeed,	there	are	cases	where	(i)	two	of	our	desires	conflict,	(ii)	we	are	aware	that	they	conflict,	but	(iii)	it	is	rational	to	hold	on	to	both.	After	all,	this	is	how	moral	
dilemmas	arise.	Consider	Sartre’s	renowned	student,	who	faces	the	choice	between	leaving	Paris	to	fight	the	Nazis	and	staying	in	Paris	to	look	after	his	ailing	mother	(Sartre	1946).	Both	the	desire	to	fight	the	Nazis	and	the	desire	to	tend	to	his	mother	are	commendable,	but	they	are	incompatible.	The	decision	which	one	to	pursue	is	not	an	easy	one,	and	at	least	for	a	while,	the	student	can	reasonably	desire	both	–	contrary	to	what	Brentano	appears	to	claim.	Accordingly,	both	desires	merely	present-as-goodPF	their	respective	objects.			 At	the	same	time,	there	seems	to	be	an	important	insight	in	Brentano’s	appeal	to	the	prima	facie/all-things-considered	distinction	in	drawing	the	
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emotion/will	distinction.	Certainly	it	is	true	that	our	pro	attitudes	divide	into	two	importantly	different	groups,	depending	on	whether	they	cast	their	objects	as	prima	facie	or	all-things-considered	good.	When	it	comes	time	to	try	and	implement	his	pro	attitudes	in	the	world,	Sartre’s	student	must	choose	between	the	two	options,	thus	entering	a	new	kind	of	mental	state	that	surpasses	his	conflicting	desires	and	paves	the	way	to	action.	Entering	that	mental	state	is	the	beginning	of	mobilizing	the	will.			 How	are	we	to	resolve	these	tensions?	Two	strategies	present	themselves.	The	first	strategy	is	to	deny	that	desire	is	a	volitional	state	and	argue	that,	on	reflection,	it	turns	out	to	be	an	emotional	state.	The	other	is	to	renounce	the	notion	that	there	is	a	sharp	line	between	will	and	emotion	and	placing	desire	in	the	‘gray	area’	between	them.	Although	I	think	both	we	can	find	support	for	both	strategies	in	the	Brentanian	corpus,	here	I	will	focus	on	the	former,	which	is	more	straightforward.		To	see	the	rationale	for	the	reclassification	strategy,	we	should	first	observe	that	although	in	analytic	philosophy	of	mind	desire	is	taken	as	the	paradigmatic	state	of	the	will,	other	philosophical	traditions,	notably	the	phenomenological	tradition,	have	opted	for	other	paradigms.	According	to	Paul	Ricœur,	for	example,	the	paradigmatic	will	state	is	decision:	it	is	in	deciding	to	ϕ	that	we	exercise	our	will	in	the	fullest	sense	(Ricœur	1950).	It	is	in	decision	that	the	mind	passes	from	considering	several	potential	good	courses	of	action	to	settling	on	one:	
What	is	remarkable	is	that	the	decision,	cut	off	from	its	execution	by	a	delay,	by	a	blank,	is	nonetheless	not	indifferent	to	its	execution;	when	I	have	decided	to	make	a	delicate	move,	I	feel	myself	somehow	charged,	in	the	way	a	battery	is	charged:	I	have	the	power	to	act,	I	am	capable	of	it.	(Ricœur	1950:	62)	Moreover,	Ricœur’s	reason	for	this	is	precisely	that	desire	involves	only	a	
hypothetical	pull	to	action,	whereas	decision’s	commitment	to	action	is	categorical	(Ricœur	1950:	70).	It	is	essential	to	my	desire	for	crème	brûlée	that	if	no	other	considerations	outweigh	it,	it	would	lead	to	my	eating	the	crème.	Thus	in	desire	the	
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connection	to	action	is	conditional	or	hypothetical:	the	desire	presents	the	action	as	to	be	performed	if	there	are	no	countervailing	considerations/desires.	In	contrast,	a	decision’s	connection	to	action	is	categorical:	in	making	the	decision	to	eat	the	crème	brûlée,	I	commit	to	eating	it,	period.	The	commitment	is	unconditional.7	This	is	what	makes	decision	an	exercise	of	the	will.	Likewise,	if	Sartre’s	student	finally	decides	to	go	to	war,	he	settles	into	a	mental	state	that	presents-as-goodUF	that	option.	That	option	is	no	longer	cast	as	good	only	in	a	sense	that	allows	other,	incompatible	options	to	also	be	good.	It	is	cast	as	all-things-considered	good	(see	Kriegel	2015	Chap.	2).	This	may	open	the	door	to	the	notion	of	reclassifying	desire	as	an	emotional	state.	Desire	is	after	all	a	passion	rather	than	an	action,	something	we	find	ourselves	with	rather	than	something	that	issues	from	exercise	of	our	will.	In	contrast,	when	we	make	a	decision	we	precisely	exercise	our	will;	to	that	extent,	decision	is	a	phenomenon	of	the	will	par	excellence.	There	is	thus	a	bright	line	between	the	two	phenomena.	As	Wallace	puts	it:	
…	intentions,	decisions,	and	choices	are	things	we	do,	primitive	examples	of	the	phenomenon	of	agency	itself.	It	is	one	thing	to	find	that	one	wants	some	chocolate	cake	very	much,	…	quite	another	to	resolve	[i.e.,	decide]	to	eat	a	piece.	The	difference,	I	would	suggest,	marks	a	line	of	fundamental	importance,	the	line	between	the	passive	and	the	active	in	our	psychological	lives.	(Wallace	1999:	637)	This	is	especially	true	given	that	anything	one	‘feels	like’	doing	can	be	described	as	a	desire	of	one’s.	So	one	option	for	Brentano	is	to	simply	deny	that	desire	is	a	state	of	the	will.	The	phenomenon	of	conflicting	desires	would	then	be	seen	as	to	be	
expected.8			 In	some	places,	Brentano	too	highlights	the	role	of	decision,	rather	than	desire,	in	the	will.	In	one	place,	he	even	states	that	‘every	act	of	the	will	(Wollen)	constitutes	a	decision’	(1952:	219	[137]).	Admittedly,	this	does	not	quite	imply	a	reclassification	of	desire	as	an	emotion.	But	there	are	passages	in	Brentano	that	clearly	support	such	reclassification.	Recall	Brentano’s	claim	that	volitional	states	
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involve	the	belief	that	their	intentional	object	‘lie	within	one’s	power’	(1874:	II,	103	[249]).	In	several	places,	Brentano	is	explicit	that	desire	need	not	involve	such	a	belief.	For	example:		
Kant	indeed	defined	the	faculty	of	desire	(Begehrung)	simply	as	‘the	capacity	to	bring	into	existence	the	objects	of	one’s	presentations	through	those	presentations.’…	This	is	why	we	find	in	Kant	that	curious	claim	that	any	wish	(Wünsch),	even	if	it	were	recognized	to	be	impossible,	such	as	the	wish	to	have	wings	for	example,	is	an	attempt	to	obtain	what	is	wished	for	and	contains	a	presentation	of	our	desire’s	causal	efficacy.	(1874:	II,	117	[259])	Brentano	is	thus	committed	to	the	first	two	premises	of	the	following	straightforward	argument:	for	any	subject	S	and	object	x,	1)	necessarily,	if	S	has	a	volitional	state	directed	at	x,	then	S	believes	that	S	can	obtain	x;	2)	possibly,	S	desires	x	and	S	believes	that	S	cannot	obtain	x;	therefore,	3)	desiring	is	not	a	volitional	state.9			
Conclusion		Brentano’s	overall	theory	of	will	and	emotion	can	be	summarized	in	terms	of	three	theses:			(T1)	What	makes	a	mental	state	M	a	state	of	the	will	(a	‘volitional’	state)	is	that	M	exhibits	a	particular	evaluative	attitudinal	property,	namely,	what	we	called	presenting-as-ultima-facie-good.	(T2)	What	makes	a	mental	state	M	an	emotional	state	is	that	M	exhibits	another	evaluative	attitudinal	property,	namely,	presenting-as-prima-facie-good.	(T3)	Because	the	evaluative	attitudinal	properties	characteristic	of	volitional	and	emotional	states	are	species	of	a	single	generic	attitudinal	property,	namely	presenting-as-good,	volitional	and	emotional	states	belong	to	a	single	natural	kind	of	mental	states.		
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Together,	these	amount	to	a	unified	evaluative-attitudinal	account	of	will	and	emotion,	with	a	clear	distinction	between	them	flowing	naturally	from	the	overarching	framework.			 I	promised	the	reader	at	the	opening	that	Brentano’s	theory	of	will	and	emotion	is	both	original	and	plausible.	The	view’s	originality	is	probably	clear	by	now.	In	contemporary	philosophy	of	mind,	only	Bennett	Helm	(2001)	has	defended	a	unified	evaluative	account	of	will	and	emotion.10	(And	the	particulars	of	Brentano’s	attitudinal	picture,	including	Brentano’s	specific	attitudinal	distinction	between	will	and	emotion,	are	absent	in	Helm.)	But	despite	its	originality,	Brentano’s	picture	has	much	to	recommend	it.	On	the	one	hand,	it	is	both	phenomenologically	and	architecturally	evident	that	states	of	will	and	emotion	involve	evaluations	of	their	objects:	phenomenologically,	wanting	or	liking	or	being	happy	about	something	clearly	embodies	a	felt	positive	stance	toward	it;	architecturally,	the	special	motivational	role	and	action-guiding	force	of	will	and	emotion	suggest	that	they	evaluate	their	objects	as	worth	pursuing	or	avoiding.	At	the	same	time,	the	evaluations	involved	do	not	seem	to	be	part	of	the	contents	willed	or	emoted	about,	but	rather	appear	built	into	the	very	attitudes	we	take	toward	those	contents.	This,	again,	is	both	phenomenologically	plausible	and	manifest	from	the	manner	we	ordinarily	report	our	volitional	and	emotional	states:	typically,	we	both	feel	and	say	that	we	are	happy	to	see	our	friend,	not	that	we	are	happy	that	seeing	our	friend	is	good.	Within	this	framework,	the	difference	between	being	happy	to	see	one’s	friend	and	deciding	to	see	one’s	friend	is	rahter	elegantly	captured	by	the	difference	between	two	species	of	attitudinal	evaluation,	a	prima	facie	one	and	an	all-things-considered	one.11			
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dispositional	state.	For	Brentano	(1874:	60	[I,	86])	rejects	the	existence	of	dispositional	mental	states.	Accordingly,	he	takes	desire	and	other	interest	states	to	be	occurrent	conscious	states.	They	are	occurrent	pro	attitudes,	then.		6	If	we	introduce	gradient	incompatibility,	whereby	x’s	existence	probabilifies	y’s	nonexistence,	we	could	also	define	a	continuum	of	states	between	pure	emotions	and	pure	desires.	But	this	is	not	strictly	forced	on	us:	some	bright	line	might	be	drawn	somewhere	along	the	envisaged	continuum.	In	that	case,	the	will/emotion	distinction	remains	dichotomous.		7	This	does	not	mean	that	decisions	cannot	involve	conditional	commitment	to	action.	It	is	just	that	when	they	do,	the	conditionality	must	be	part	of	their	content.	I	can	certainly	decide	that	I	want	the	crème	brûlée	unless	it	takes	20	extra	minutes	to	prepare.	Here	I	enter	a	mental	state	with	an	unconditional	attitudinal	commitment	to	a	conditional	content.	(This	is	to	be	distinguished	from	a	case	where	I	simply	decide	to	get	the	crème	brûlée	but	am	later	told	that	it	will	take	an	extra	20	minutes	to	prepare,	whereupon	I	make	a	new	decision.	This	is	not	a	case	of	a	conditional	decision,	but	rather	of	a	change	my	mind	from	one	unconditional	decision	to	another.)			8	A	more	nuanced	version	of	this	move	would	distinguish	two	notions	of	desire	and	place	one	in	the	emotional	domain	and	the	other	in	the	volitional	domain.	Thus,	in	his	book	Desire,	G.F.	Schueler	distinguishes	between	two	notions	of	desire:	‘In	one	sense	of	“desire,”	…	from	the	fact	that	an	agent	intentionally	performed	some	action,	it	follows	that	he	or	she	wanted	to	do	whatever	it	was	that	action	was	supposed	to	achieve.	But	in	the	other	perfectly	good	sense	of	“desire,”	there	is	nothing	at	all	problematic	or	mysterious	about	people	doing	things	they	have	no	desire	to	do,	things	they	don’t	
	 25	
																																																																																																																																																																					
want	to	do	at	all.	I	would	say,	for	instance,	that	I	had	no	desire	to	attend	a	meeting	at	my	son’s	school	the	other	evening.	I	would	much	rather	have	stayed	home	and	read.	But	I	did	attend	the	meeting	because	I	believed	I	had	a	responsibility	to	do	so…	(Schueler	1995:	29;	italics	original)	In	one	sense	of	the	term,	Schueler	clearly	wanted	to	go	to	the	meeting	–	or	else	he	would	not	have	ended	up	there.	But	in	another	sense,	he	did	not	want	to	go	at	all	–	there	are	any	number	of	relevant	alternatives	he	preferred.	The	first	notion	of	desire,	somewhat	theoretically	motivated	within	the	‘belief-desire	psychology’	framework,	conceives	of	desire	as	committed	to	ultima	facie	goodness.	The	second	notion	of	desire,	more	pretheoretic,	conceives	of	desire	as	committed	only	to	prima	facie	goodness.	With	this	distinction	in	place,	Brentano	could	say	this:	desire	construed	in	the	first	way	is	a	bona	fide	volitional	state,	but	does	not	allow	‘conflicting	desires’;	conflicting	desires	are	possible	if	we	operate	with	the	second	notion	of	desire,	but	in	that	sense	desire	is	rather	an	emotional	state.	Either	way,	DISTINCTION3	is	unaffected	by	the	objection	from	conflicting	desires.		9	Clearly,	Brentano	tends	to	make	the	point	with	emphasis	on	wishing,	which	is	more	antecedently	amenable	to	reclassification	as	an	emotion	than	desiring;	but	equally	clearly,	he	plans	to	extend	the	same	treatment	to	the	latter	as	well.		10	Helm	offers	this	also	as	part	of	an	integrated	account	that	covers	even	pleasure	and	pain.	Interestingly,	so	does	Brentano!	See	Brentano	1874:	II,	92-3	[242].		11	For	comments	on	a	previous	draft,	I	am	grateful	to	Julien	Deonna,	Guillaume	Fréchette,	Anna	Giustina,	Josh	Shepherd,	and	Fabrice	Teroni.	I	have	also	benefited	from	presenting	drafts	of	this	chapter	to	two	different	audiences	at	École	Normale	Supérieure	and	to	one	at	the	University	of	Geneva.	I	am	grateful	to	the	audiences	there,	in	particular	Mathilde	Berger-Perrin,	Romain	Bourdoncle,	Géraldine	Carranante,	Lionel	Djadaojee,	Vincent	Grandjean,	Maria	Gyemant,	Lylian	Paquet,	and	Justin	Winzenrieth.	This	work	was	supported	by	the	French	National	Research	Agency’s	grants	ANR-11-0001-02	PSL*	and	ANR-10-LABX-0087,	as	well	as	by	grant	675415	of	the	European	Union’s	Horizon	2020	Research	and	Innovation	program.	
